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Recent studies have documented systematic exchanges of favors between politicians and firms, and 
that connected firms, on average gain from political ties. This paper asks whether politically connected 
firms attempt to obscure such gains in their reported accounting information. We employ a recently 
built database on political ties, and find that the quality of accounting information disclosed by 
politically connected firms is significantly poorer than the quality of information of similar non-
connected companies. Additionally, among connected firms, those that have stronger political ties 
have the poorest accruals quality. This evidence suggests that managers of connected firms appear to 
be less sensitive to market pressures to increase the quality of information. This choice seems to be 
justified in that lower quality reported earnings is associated with higher cost of debt only for the non-
politically connected firms in the sample.  
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The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms 
 
Revelations that politicians and firms exchange favors appear almost daily in the media. These 
stories describe events across the spectrum of rich and poor, large and small, and in more and less 
corrupt societies. The few (but rapidly growing) academic studies on the subject document a wide 
range of benefits received by politically connected firms.1 Presumably, these benefits are shared 
among the connected firms’ owners. Similarly, there is widespread evidence that politicians can expect 
money, favors, and votes from various business interests.2  
One aspect not considered by existing studies is how the quality of accounting information 
reported by publicly traded firms is affected by the existence of political connections. The ongoing 
debate over managerial incentives to manage earnings reported to the public focuses mostly on 
whether such management results in higher or lower accounting information quality.3 There is far less 
discussion of whether earnings management varies systematically with firm characteristics and/or the 
environment in which the firm operates. Recent evidence in Leuz et al. (2003) demonstrates that 
country-level factors, such as equity market development, investor rights, and legal enforcement are 
statistically significantly related to a country’s median level of earnings management. These authors 
posit that managerial incentives interact with the legal and institutional environment to produce 
systematic differences across countries. We pursue this incentives-based explanation further by 
exploiting potentially important variation at the firm-level, such as whether the firm is controlled by a 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Cull and Xu (2005), Johnson and Mitton (2003), and Khwaja and Mian (2005) for evidence 
of preferential access to credit; Backman (1999) and Dinç (2005) for evidence of preferential treatment by 
government owned banks; Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) for preferential treatment in the award of government 
contracts; and Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) for bailouts. 
2 See Svensson (2003), Cull and Xu (2005), and Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2003) for a discussion of bribes, 
and Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar (2004), and Fan and Wong (2006) for vote-buying behavior. 
Bertrand et al. (2004) also discuss the employment consequences of connections and their impact on voting for 
politicians. 
3 More generally, Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) argue that from a corporate governance perspective, activities 
that increase transparency may result in lower profits. 
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family or other large shareholder, or whether there is a direct connection to a politician. We find that 
these attributes do matter; indeed they remain statistically significant predictors of earnings quality 
even after country-level factors are controlled for in our regression analysis. 
Earnings management is often seen as a tool used by managers attempting to mislead, hide, or 
obscure information from shareholders or the public (e.g., Schipper, 1989, or Shivakumar, 2000). 
Since politically connected firms derive net gains from their connections, one might expect to observe 
a greater frequency of such opportunistic earnings management (e.g., as connected insiders attempt to 
avoid sharing gains with investors). However, earnings management has its costs. That is, a number of 
studies have shown that poor earnings quality results in more frequent enforcement actions by the SEC 
(Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996), lawsuits (Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper, 1994), a higher cost 
of both debt and equity capital (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2004, 2005), and poor future 
returns (Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 2006).  
Thus, while there may be greater opportunity in politically connected firms to manipulate 
earnings, the costs of doing so can outweigh the gains. Empirically, we show that politically connected 
firms provide lower quality accounting earnings than do their non-connected peers. Moreover, we 
provide evidence that lower quality reported earnings is associated with higher cost of debt only for 
the non-politically connected firms in the sample. That is, companies that have political connections 
apparently face little negative consequences from their lower quality disclosures. 
The empirical evidence we provide in this study is derived from two primary data bases. First, 
we employ a large firm-level data set on corporate political connections developed by Faccio (2006). 
Second, using underlying accounting data available in Worldscope, we construct a measure of 
accounting earnings quality based on the variability of discretionary accruals. As discussed above, we 
also check whether the effects of political connections on accounting information quality depend on 
characteristics of the ownership structure (e.g., the existence of large shareholders or family control).  
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The next section briefly describes how the political connections database was originally 
compiled. We then describe how we construct our proxy for accounting earnings quality. Sections 3 
and 4 present our results and robustness tests. In section 5 we address the issue of endogeneity. We 
provide some justification for the reporting behavior of connected firms in section 6. We offer our 
conclusions in section 7.  
 
I. Political ties. 
A company is classified as politically connected if at least one of its large shareholders 
(anybody directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of votes) or top directors (CEO, chairman of 
the board, president, vice-president, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister or a head of 
state, or is tightly related to a politician or party. These close relationships include cases of friendship, 
past top political (e.g., a head of state or minister) or corporate positions, as well as other ties 
identified in prior studies.  
Connections with government ministers include cases in which the politician himself is a large 
shareholder or a top director, as well as cases where a politician’s close relative (e.g., the son or 
daughter) holds such positions. Connections with a member of parliament, however, are recorded only 
when members of parliament themselves are shareholders or top directors, but do not consider cases 
when such positions are held by relatives. This was due to data limitations. Close relationships consist 
of cases of well-known friendship; share ownership or directorships held by former heads of state or 
prime ministers as well as former directorships held by current politicians, foreign politicians, and well 
documented relationships with political parties (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; and Johnson and Mitton, 
2003).  
To establish the presence of connections, the names of top company directors were taken from 
Worldscope, Extel, company websites, and Lexis-Nexis, and the names of blockholders were identified 
from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), the web sites of the stock 
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exchanges or their supervisory authorities, Worldscope, and Extel. The Chiefs of State directory (CIA, 
2001) and the official website of the country’s government and parliament were used to gather the 
names of members of parliament or government. In addition to these academic studies, The 
Economist, Forbes and Fortune are also used as primary sources of information for well-known cases 
of friendships.  
For this study, we focus on countries with at least 5 politically connected companies in the Faccio 
(2006) database, which results in an initial sample of 21 countries and 17,435 companies. Since these 
connections are recorded between 1997 and 2001, and our analysis focuses on subsequent accounting 
information, endogeneity problems should be mitigated. We reconsider this issue in the robustness 
section. Matching this sample to those firms with the necessary accounting data ultimately reduces our 
sample as described below. The final sample of companies, including the number of connected 
companies, by country, is presented in Table 1, and is discussed in Section III below. We first describe 
our measure of earnings quality using data on accruals. 
 
II. The quality of accounting earnings data. 
Users of accounting information are often interested in assessing current performance as well 
estimating future performance, and there is considerable debate concerning how well various 
accounting measures reflect these goals. Some of the firm’s transactions require only a mechanical 
application of accounting rules while other types rely on the judgment of the firm’s managers and 
accountants. This judgment introduces errors – both intentional as well as unintentional. However, 
with respect to quality, the source of the error does not matter; both types reduce the quality of 
reported earnings. We follow other researchers in focusing on (the variability of) such errors estimated 
from a benchmark model of accounting accruals. Hence, a higher variance of unexplained accruals is 
associated with lower quality earnings data. 
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Accounting researchers consider reported earnings as a primary indicator of information 
quality (e.g., Dechow 1994, and Dechow et al. 1998).4 Because earnings, and cash from operations, 
differ by the amount of reported accruals, a standard practice is to focus on the magnitude and the 
variability of accruals to assess their quality, and thus indirectly the quality of reported earnings. In 
general, accruals include both discretionary and non-discretionary components. Below we describe our 
empirical approach to estimating these components. 
Sloan (1996) finds that the accrual portion of earnings is less persistent than cash flows, 
implying that firms with high levels of accruals have lower quality earnings. Other studies suggest that 
managers affect the direction and magnitude of accruals, including Healy and Whalen (1999), and 
Dechow, et al. (1996), and Richardson, et al. (2003). Dechow et al. (1996), for example, find that 38 
firms subject to SEC accounting and auditing enforcement release reported higher accruals than a 
control group, and Richardson, et al. (2003) document that firms reported higher accruals in periods 
preceding earnings restatements. However, given the inherent negative autocorrelation in accruals, 
opportunistic use will result in ‘excessive’ variability in earnings.5 Hence, most research has 
emphasized the variability of accruals, in particular of discretionary accruals (Francis et al. 2004, 
2005).  
We estimate a pooled time-series cross-sectional regression for country j’s (non-discretionary) 
total current accruals as a function of the firm’s change in sales (∆Sales), its gross investment in 
                                                 
4  Dechow (1994) reports that if stock returns are used as a measure of performance, earnings are more highly 
correlated with stock returns than are current period cash flows. In Dechow et al. (1998), earnings are shown to 
be a better proxy for future cash flows than current cash flows. Because of this, earnings are often used in firm 
valuation models as well as a measure of firm performance. 
5  For example, suppose an economic event results in a firm recognizing sales in period t. However, the firm 
allows the customer to pay within 90 days. In this case, an accrual (accounts receivable) is created and will 
reverse in the future when the cash is collected. 
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physical plant and equipment (GPPE), and industry and time dummies, using financial data from 
Worldscope.6  
ijt
ijt
ijt
j
ijt
ijt
j
ijt
ijt dummiesyearandindustry
GPPESalesTCA εβα +++∆=
AssetsAssetsAssets
 (1) 
where: ∆ is the first difference (with respect to time) operator, and Total Current Accruals (TCA) 
equal,  
ijtTCA = ∆(Current Assets)ijt  – ∆(Current Liabilities) ijt  – ∆(Cash)ijt  
          + ∆(Short term and Current long term Debt)ijt, 
Current Assets (WC02201) is the sum of cash and equivalents, receivables, inventories, prepaid 
expenses and other current assets.  
Current Liabilities (WC03101) represents debt or other obligations that the company expects to 
satisfy within one year.  
Cash (WC02001) represents the sum of cash and short term investments.  
Short Term and Current Long Term Debt (WC03051) represents that portion of financial debt 
payable within one year including current portion of long term debt and sinking fund 
requirements of preferred stock or debentures.  
                                                 
6 As a robustness check, we estimate accruals using several different estimation techniques (including using 
Total Accruals instead of Total Current Accruals). One accruals estimate is computed following DeFond and 
Park (2001). In this approach, abnormal accruals are computed on a firm-level basis as the difference between 
realized working capital and an expectation of working capital based on the firm’s prior period’s historical 
relation between working capital to sales. A second approach used by McNichols (2002) includes lagged, 
concurrent, and future period’s cash from operations in the estimated model for accruals (see Dechow and 
Dichev (2002)). Cash from operations is computed using the balance sheet approach. This second approach 
results in a smaller sample due to data restrictions. Using these measures of discretionary accruals, our results for 
both 5 and 10-year earnings quality measures are qualitatively unchanged. 
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Assets (WC02999) are the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other 
assets, 
Sales (WC01001) are defined as gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts returns and 
allowances, and,  
GPPE is the sum of net property, plant and equipment (WC02501) plus accumulated reserves for 
depreciation, depletion and amortization (WC02401).  
The industry dummies are built based on Campbell’s (1996) industry classification.  
Equation (1) is estimated on a country-by-country basis including all firms with the requisite 
accounting data in any given year. The error term is the estimate of discretionary accruals. Accrual 
quality, for each firm i, is computed as the standard deviation of its residual ( ijtεˆ ), using the most 
recent 10 years available in Worldscope. In cases with less than 10 years available, we require at least 
9 annual observations (during 1985-2005). This allows us to compute our first accruals quality 
variable for a sample of 5,987 firms. We were then able to match 4,906 of these firms with those in the 
Faccio (2006) database of political connections described in Section I above. Since regression (1) 
produces an estimate of discretionary accruals, a higher residual standard deviation reflects lower 
quality reported earnings. 
Since requiring 10 years of data may introduce some severe survivorship bias in our results, 
we re-compute a similar measure using only 5 years of data, which is available for 13,778 firms.7 In 
this case, data on political connections is available for 7,318 of these companies. Most of this 
difference is due to firms being added to Worldscope after 2001, i.e. after the political connections 
data base was compiled.  
                                                 
7 Francis et al. (2004) and Francis et al. (2005), use 10-years, and 5-years of data respectively in estimating the 
standard deviation of accruals.  
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III. Descriptive statistics. 
Matching the accounting data from Worldscope with the data on political connections, and 
requiring that there be at least one connected firm in each country, our final sample includes 7,318 
firms, 322 of which are connected to a politician, from 21 countries. Table 1 presents a number of 
summary statistics at the country level. The overall impression is that there is wide variation in the 
sample across all of the country-level measures tabulated.  
[Table 1 goes about here] 
For example, there is wide variation in both the number of firms and the number of connected 
firms per country. The countries range from poor (India and Indonesia) to rich (e.g., Canada, 
Denmark, and the United States), from high corruption (the Philippines, India, Indonesia, Russia) to 
low corruption (Denmark and Singapore). Finally, the average firm size (2005 U.S $ market 
capitalization) varies widely, with relatively large firms sampled in Russia (only four firms included), 
France, Italy, Mexico (at least relative to per capita income), Switzerland, and the United States. We 
describe the additional variables presented in Table 1 in more detail when we discuss the country 
specific control variables (in section III.b) below.  
Given this cross-country variation, we take several precautions in our multivariate regression 
analysis. First, we report OLS estimates with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country 
level. Moulton (1990) strikingly illustrates how clustering within a group biases estimated standard 
errors downward. The problem affects the standard errors on aggregate effects (e.g., corruption), on 
individual-specific response variables (e.g., earnings quality). In particular, since intra-group 
observations (in this case, a country) share common, perhaps unobservable, characteristics, a 
fundamental assumption (i.e., independence) of most estimation methods is violated. In addition to 
adjusting the standard errors for clustering, a natural concern is that this wide cross-country variation 
might increase the potential for extreme observations, especially for OLS estimation. This suggests an 
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alternative estimation procedure might be better suited in our empirical setting. Hence, for robustness 
purposes, we also present estimates from a median regression framework, which minimizes the sum of 
the absolute value of residuals (see Koeneker and Hallock, 2001). Mostly, we find the results are 
robust to the inclusion/exclusion of outliers (we discuss the details in the robustness section below). 
Finally, we also repeated several of our benchmark specifications after eliminating entire countries, 
one at a time, from the analysis. Again, we find the results robust to this precaution.  
 
III.a. Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 presents the univariate associations of our two primary measures of accounting 
information quality vis-à-vis the specific connections variables, and firm ownership structures. In the 
first set of three columns we focus on the (10-year) standard deviation of discretionary accruals. Note 
that higher values of this variable indicate lower earnings quality. In the second set of three columns in 
the table we display the same information for the (5-year) standard deviation of discretionary accruals. 
Each set of three rows present statistics by firm characteristic. For example, there are 205 
connected firms for which we can compute the 10-year standard deviation, and its mean value for 
connected firms is 0.0646, and is 0.0598 for other firms. The difference between these means is 
statistically significant at the 7% level. The difference in earnings quality between family and non-
family firms is highly statistically significant for both the 5-, and 10-year measures. For the 5-year 
measure we see that the number of connected and family owned firms increases to 322 and 1,445 
respectively. Before considering specific types of firm-politician connections note that there are 933 
family owned firms for which we can compute our 10-year measure of earnings quality. The 
difference in earnings quality between family and non-family firms is highly statistically significant 
(p-values < 0.001), with family firms exhibiting a higher mean (lower quality earning) than non family 
firms.  
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Connections can be divided into two sub-groups: 
 a) when a connection is tied to a government official (Gov), when a connection is tied to a 
minister of parliament (MP), or when the connection is through a friendship or other indirect 
connection (Other). These categories are not strictly mutually exclusive, i.e., there are 4 observations 
in which Gov=1 and Other =1, for the 10-year standard deviation of discretionary accruals measure of 
earnings quality, 5 observations in which Gov=1 and Other =1 and 1 observation in which MP=1 and 
Other=1, for the 5-year standard deviation of discretionary accruals measure of earnings quality. 
 b) when a connection is through a major shareholder (Own) or when the connection is 
through a director (Director). There is also a small overlap (of 11 observations) between these two 
measures for the 10-year measure, and 17 observations for the 5-year measure. 
[Table 2 goes about here] 
For specific connections we see that the strongest connections occur when they involve a high 
government official, or a close personal friendship, or when the connection is through a major 
shareholder (Faccio, 2006). Only when we focus on connections established at the director level are 
the differences in earnings quality statistically insignificant, and differences in earnings quality 
between firms with connections established through members of parliament versus non-connected 
companies are statistically significant (at the 7% level) only when we use the 10-year measure. In 
general however, results are very similar for either the 5-, or 10-year measures of earnings quality. 
Overall, the analysis suggests that there are statistically significant differences in discretionary 
accruals for: connected and non-connected firms, and for family versus non-family firms. Of course, 
this univariate analysis cannot answer the questions which types of connections are most important, or 
whether the connections depend on country characteristics, such as the overall level of corruption 
within a country, or on other firm attributes, e.g., its size, market to book, or leverage.  For these 
questions we turn to a multiple regression analysis.  
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III.b. Control variables 
Prior to reporting our regression results, we describe a number of firm and country 
characteristics that we use as controls in our multivariate analysis. Their inclusion is motivated by 
prior studies that have found them associated with the quality of accounting information at the firm or 
at the country level (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2006, Fan and Wong, 2002, Leuz et al., 2003).  
First, note that closely held firms, (e.g., family firms) may also be more inclined to establish 
political connections (Morck et al., 2000, Morck and Yeung, 2004). Hence, in an effort to insure that 
our political connections indicator is not mixing the effects of a firm’s ownership structure and the 
effects of its connections on its reporting incentives, we introduce controls for family firms (Family), 
and for the size of the voting stake held by the largest ultimate shareholder (Control). The ownership 
and control data are taken from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), the 
web sites of the stock exchanges or their supervisory authorities, Worldscope, and Extel. The 
ownership related data are generally recorded as of the end of 1997. 
We define Family as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a family or 
individual controlling at least 20% of the votes, and 0 otherwise. Control is constructed according to 
La Porta et al. (1999), who argue that an investor can gain control in a corporation by directly owning 
a controlling stake, or indirectly through holding shares in another corporation. In the first case, an 
investor’s share of control rights will correspond to the fraction of votes he is entitled to express. In 
the second case, the investor’s share of the control rights is measured by the weakest control link along 
the pyramid. We also allow for a non-linear impact of Control on accrual quality by including the 
squared value of this variable (Control2) in some regression specifications. 
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Additional firm characteristics included in the regressions are computed from accounting data 
taken from Worldscope (with identifier), and measured for year 1997.8 First, the firm’s size 
(LnMkCap), is measured as the natural log of the company’s market capitalization (WC07210) in US 
dollars. We also control for the annual growth of sales during 1997 (SalGrwt), and standard deviation 
(SalGrwtSD) of sales (WC08631) during 1994-2005 (or the shorter period for which the data is 
available). Similarly, MTB is defined as the ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity 
(MTBV), and Leverage is total debt as percentage of total assets (WC08236).  
Finally, the country-level variables (Rights, and Corruption) are also included as separate 
controls. Rights is the interaction between the index of Anti-Director Rights (La Porta et al., 1998), 
and the index of Legal Enforcement. Anti-Director Rights is defined by La Porta et al. (1998), as: 
“The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to 
the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ 
meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is 
allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share 
capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or 
equal to 10 percent, or (6) shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can be waived only by a 
shareholders’ vote.” La Porta et al. (1998), Legal Enforcement is computed as the average across the 
degree of efficiency of the judicial system, an assessment of the rule of law, and corruption. Given 
these variables are highly correlated we use their interaction rather than entering these two variables 
separately. Conceptually, the interaction should capture the combined effect of legal quality and 
whether there is enforcement of those laws. 
                                                 
8  Fixing the independent variables as of 1997 makes the assumption of independence and exogeneity more 
plausible given that our dependent variable is measured over a 10-year period ending in 2005. We did however 
repeat all of the empirical analysis defining the independent variables as of 2005. None of our conclusions are 
affected by this choice. 
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Our measure of Corruption within a country is taken from Transparency International 
(www.transparency.org). The index measures the “degree to which corruption is perceived to exist 
among public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, drawing on 14 different polls and 
surveys from seven independent institutions, carried out among business people and country analysts, 
including surveys of residents, both local and expatriate.” Corruption represents “the abuse of public 
office for private gain.” Transparency International’s index for 1997 is rescaled from 0 to 10, with 
higher values indicating higher corruption. 
 
III.c. Regression Analysis  
Table 3 presents OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is (see equation (1)), 
computed over a 10 year period (generally 1996-2005). The independent variables are measures of 
connections, ownership variables, and other company and country-level attributes. All regressions 
include industry dummies defined at the 4-digit SIC level. P-values, corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and clustering at the country level, are reported in parentheses below the coefficients estimates.  
[Table 3 goes about here] 
Regression (1) uses the all-inclusive measure of connections; we then partition these 
connections into individual types in regressions (4) and (5). In Regression (1), we find that 
connections are positively and significantly related to accruals quality (p-value < 0.04). The magnitude 
of the coefficient is economically large, and indicates that the presence of connections is associated 
with an 18% increase in the dependent variable (1.0959/6.0029).9 Consistent with earlier studies, we 
find that the standard deviation of discretionary accruals is lower for larger companies; on the other 
hand, it increases with sales growth and the volatility of sales growth. We also find a higher standard 
deviation of discretionary accruals in high market-to-book firms, and a lower standard deviation of 
discretionary accruals in highly levered companies. Surprisingly, we find no correlation between 
                                                 
9 6.0029 is the sample average of the dependent variable. 
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accruals quality and the degree of corruption in a given country, or accruals quality and the quality of 
the legal system. This last result contrasts with earlier findings by Leuz et al. (2003). We are limited in 
the number of country-variables we can control for because of the relatively low number of countries 
in the study (21) and also because of the high correlation between several of the country variables. Our 
results are qualitatively unchanged after we control for industry fixed-effects (regression 2). To verify 
that our results are not driven by other country attributes, in Regression (3) we add country dummies 
(in place of the Rights and Corruption variables which are country specific). The previous results are 
robust to the new specification. The only major change is the increase in the explanatory power (R2) of 
the regression model. 
In Regressions (4) and (5) we partition connections into specific types. Previous studies (e.g., 
Faccio, 2006) have found that connections through the head of state or a government minister (either 
direct or through close relationships) are more valuable to firms than connections through a member of 
parliament. This likely reflects the larger benefits these firms receive and may need to “hide.” 
Similarly, previous findings document a larger impact of connections through a block-holder, relative 
to connections through a director. Because of this, we expect companies with stronger connections to 
exhibit lower accounting quality. Our results support this expectation and we find that the coefficients 
on the stronger types of connections are always larger than those of weaker connections types. 
In regressions (6) and (7) we add some governance variables. Fan and Wong (2002) find that 
closely held companies disclose less meaningful accounting information. To the extent that our 
measures of connectedness are correlated with ownership variables, we need to assess the robustness 
of our prior results to the inclusion of these additional controls. For our purposes, we start by 
controlling for the concentration of control (voting rights) in the hands of the largest shareholder.10 To 
better separate the alignment and entrenchment effects present at different levels of concentration of 
                                                 
10 As the ownership data is available only for a sub-sample of the companies/countries in our dataset, we end up 
with a much smaller sample size in Regressions (5)-(7). 
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control, we also add the squared value of control in the model in regression (6). The results, however, 
indicate no statistical significance for this governance variable. Notice however, that connections 
remain significant. In regression (7) we isolate family firms. We find weak evidence that companies 
with a large family-blockholder use more discretion in reporting their accounting numbers, in that the 
coefficient of family firms is positive but not significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.116).  
To better control for the presence of outliers, we re-estimate the first regression using a 
median regression framework, which minimizes the sum of the absolute value of residuals (see 
Koeneker and Hallock, 2001). In these regressions, extreme observations are given less weight in the 
regression (the regression minimizes the absolute residuals rather than the squared residuals). In the 
regressions, standard errors are computed using bootstrap resampling, with 100 bootstrap replications, 
to control for heteroskedasticity (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993, and Wu, 1986). Regression (8) 
reports these robustness results. These results indicate that outliers are not a problem: the coefficient of 
connections in fact changes very little when we use a median regression approach. If anything, the 
significance of our previous results is increased.11 
We recognize that using 10 years of data to compute our dependent variable in Table 3 
potentially introduces a survivorship bias. To address this issue, we re-compute the standard deviation 
of residuals using the most recent 5 years (2001-2005) of data. In addition to reducing survivorship 
bias concerns, this measure has an added advantage. Namely, in this specification, the 
contemporaneous link between political connections and earnings quality is severed since the political 
connections dataset employed is based on a prior time period (i.e., between 1997 and 2001).12 So, it is 
clear that now our measure of connectedness precedes the period over which we assess the quality of 
                                                 
11  An additional concern, partly addressed by removing outliers, is the impact of mergers. Potentially, mergers 
could artificially induce variability in the dependent variable, thus leading us to categorize these firms as those 
with poor accounting information. Recent evidence in Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond (2006) 
however suggests that neither mergers nor restructurings have a statistically significant impact on measures of 
earnings quality, at least in the United States. 
12 Of course, this also has disadvantages, such as the new measure is more sensitive to outliers or temporary 
shocks. 
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earnings. We believe this leads to a stronger interpretation of our results in terms of “causality”. The 
new results are reported in Table 4. We continue to adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering. 
[Table 4 goes about here] 
All the results on political connections are supported when we use the shorter period to 
measure earnings quality. Regression (1) shows that being connected results in a 19% (1.0899/5.7547) 
increase in the dependent variable (e.g., thus results in lower earnings quality). This result is 
significant at the 5% level. The positive relation between connections and our new measure of accruals 
quality is supported when we add industry dummies to the model, or control for the ownership 
structure of the company (regressions 6 and 7). Once again, when we partition connections by type, 
we continue to find a larger effect for connections with the head of state or government minister (both 
direct, and those through a close relationship) rather than connections with a simple member of 
parliament. Similarly, connections through the owner are associated with a higher standard deviation 
in the amount of discretionary accruals than connections through a director. The impact of the 
ownership structure of our sample firms continues to remain marginal. On the other hand, the previous 
results on the other control variables are generally supported. With accruals quality measured using 5-
years of data, however, we lose significance for the connections variable when we add both industry 
and country dummies to the regressions. In regression (8) we use once again a median regression 
approach to control for the impact of outliers. Connections remain highly significant (p-value < 0.01) 
with this alternative specification. 
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IV. Robustness tests.  
IV.a. Exclusion of individual countries 
To provide assurances that our results are not driven by any specific country, we recursively 
repeat our estimations, omitting a single country each iteration. When the 10-year standard deviation 
of the discretionary accruals measure is used as dependent variable, the coefficients on connections are 
always positive, ranging from 0.8409 to 1.3308, and statistically significant (p-values range between 
0.001 and 0.032). When the 5-year measure is employed, the coefficients on connections range from 
0.4356 to 1.117. The coefficient is significant in 19 out of 21 regressions; only when we exclude Japan 
or Malaysia, does the coefficient lose statistical significance. 
 
IV.b. Transformations of the dependent variable and alternative estimation methods 
By construction, the dependent variable in our regression models is positive. Because of this 
truncation, the disturbance terms may not be normally distributed. A possible solution to this problem 
is to use a logistic transformation, where the new dependent variable is computed as: 
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In this case iz  satisfies ∞<<∞− iz , and thus the truncation problem is avoided. We can 
therefore employ this specification to assess the robustness of our previous results in Table 3. For 
space reasons, these robustness results are not tabulated. When we assume θ =0.0001, and re-run the 
regressions, we find that the coefficient of Connected ranges between 0.135 and 0.252, while the p-
values of this coefficient range from 0.007 to 0.028. We then allow θ  to assume larger values (e.g., 
0.01, 1, or 10) and find similar levels of significance. 
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As a second approach to this issue, we use the following inverse integral transformation to 
arrive at a new measure of accruals quality which is distributed as a standard normal variable.  First let 
iQ be our accruals quality measure described above, i.e., ( )∑
=
−−=
T
t
iiti T
Q
1
2ˆˆ
1
1 εε , for firms i=1,…,M  
is computed as the standard deviation of residuals ( itεˆ ) estimated from equation (1), using the most 
recent T years of data.  If the residuals, iTi εε ˆ ,.....,ˆ 1 , are iid normal random observations13 with mean 
0=µ  and variance 2σ , then 2 )1(2
2
~)1( −
−= Tii QTU χσ . Since µ is known, we can estimate 
2σ  with 
∑∑
= =
M
i
T
t
itMT 1 1
2)ˆ(1 ε .14 Using the 2χ cumulative density function, ( )∫= i
U
dfUF
0
)( δδ , we transform the 
Ui’s to probabilities, i.e., F(U) ~ U[0,1].  Finally, we use the inverted standard normal distribution, 
))((1 UF−Φ , to transform these probabilities, F(U), into a new measure of accruals quality, *iQ , which 
are distributed N(0,1). With these assumptions in mind, we transform our dependent variable using the 
procedure described, and re-run the regressions reported in Table 3. We now find that the coefficient 
of Connected ranges between 0.417 and 0.738. Its p-value is always significant, ranging from 0.006 to 
0.058.  
Finally, we re-run our specifications alternatively employing a Tobit estimation model, and 
using the log of our accruals quality measure as the dependent variable. All our results are unchanged. 
 
                                                 
13 It is important that the residuals are identically distributed.  Otherwise we would need to define 
2
)1(2
2
~)1( −
−= T
i
i
i
QTU χσ , and estimate 
2
iσ  with ∑
=
T
t
itT 1
2)ˆ(1 ε  
14 The formula for the estimate of 2σ  is not strictly correct since there may be a different T for each firm i. 
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V. Endogeneity. 
One potential concern for the estimates reported so far is that the decision to form connections 
may not be exogenous. In fact there may be reciprocal causation, leading our reported OLS estimates 
to be biased and inconsistent. This issue was partly addressed in Table 4, when we considered 
connections formed prior to our measure of accruals quality; however, in this section we describe 
results obtained from an instrumental variables estimation. Our choice of instrument is motivated by 
previous studies finding strong localized effects of political connections (e.g. Roberts 1990, Agrawal, 
and Knoeber, 2001). In the first stage regression, we predict (via a probit estimation) connections 
using the location of the company’s headquarters, as well as the other independent variables included 
in previous regressions. Specifically, Capital is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
company is headquartered in the capital of its country and 0 otherwise. The first-stage fitted values for 
connected (I_Connected) are then used in the second stage OLS regressions. 15 
[Table 5 goes about here] 
Table 5 reports results for each of the two measures of earnings quality discussed in Tables 3 
and 4. For each dependent variable we report both the first- and second-stage results. In all 
specifications the presence of a firm’s headquarters in the capital city is a (highly) statistically 
significant predictor of whether the firm establishes a political connection. Moreover, in each of the 
second stage regressions, the instrumented value of connections is statistically significant as well.  In 
all cases the estimated coefficient is larger than those reported using OLS, and they remain highly 
statistically significant. Other results are also similar. For example, the standard deviation of 
discretionary accruals is smaller for large firms. The only difference from the previous results is that 
we now find that firms in more corrupt societies have lower discretionary accruals, while firms 
headquartered in countries with better legal systems tend to have poorer quality accruals. We 
                                                 
15 Econometrically, we implement this using the STATA command cdsimeq, which corrects the standard errors 
for the fact that the first-stage regression is a probit estimation. 
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recognize that the significance of the country variables in this IV approach may be overstated given 
that we cannot properly control for clustering. 
 
VI. Why don’t connected firms care about the consequences of poor earnings quality? 
We have shown that, on average, the accruals quality of connected companies is poorer than 
the quality of accruals of non-connected firms. From an empirical standpoint, a number of studies 
have shown that poor accrual quality results in a number of negative consequences at the firm level, 
including a higher cost of capital, or a higher likelihood of a lawsuit. Thus the question becomes why 
connected firms appear not to care about the consequences. One possibility is that their political ties 
allow mitigating or even eliminating such effects. So, for example, it might be possible that lenders of 
connected firms provide them with relatively cheap capital, regardless to the opacity/quality of their 
accounting information. 
To address this question in detail, we focus on the cost of debt. This choice is driven by the 
fact that the overwhelming majority of studies on political ties document preferential access to credit 
for connected firms (Cull and Xu, 2005, Dinç, 2005, Johnson and Mitton, 2003, Khwaja and Mian, 
2005). Thus, perhaps due to political pressure on (government owned) banks, despite their poor 
accruals quality, connected firms are able to avoid paying higher interest rates. If that were the case, 
this would provide a justification as to why connected firms exhibit significantly poorer accruals 
quality despite the negative consequences associated with it. 
In our analysis, we follow Francis et al. (2005), and compute the cost of debt as the ratio of a 
firm’s interest expense in year t (in our case 2005) (WC01251) over the average interest bearing 
obligations outstanding as of the end of year t-1 and t (WC03255). This gives us the realized cost of 
debt in the company’s local currency. To make these rates comparable across countries, we convert 
them in U.S. dollar terms using the covered interest parity. Thus, given a cost of borrowing in the local 
currency of iLC, we define the dollar cost (iUS) of borrowing local currency, 
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⎡ +⋅= , where e0 and e1 are the spot and the one year forward rates as of 
the beginning of 2005 (e=LC/$). Table 6 reports the univariate results. Generally, we find that the cost 
of debt is higher for companies with poorer accruals. This tends to be true both for connected and non-
connected firms. However, there seem to be a larger premium applied to non-connected firms that 
report poor accounting information. Once again, it is necessary to evaluate how the results stand in a 
multivariate framework. 
[Table 6 goes about here] 
As standard in the literature, in the regressions we control for a number of factors that are 
known to influence interest rates: leverage, size, cash flow volatility, return on assets, and the interest 
coverage ratio. Leverage is total debt as percentage of total assets (WC08236) as of year end t-1; size 
(LnMkCap), is measured as the natural log of the company’s market capitalization (WC07210) in US 
dollars, as of year end t-1; volatility is the standard deviation (SalGrwtSD) of sales growth during 
1994-2005 (or the shorter period for which the data is available). We define Return on Assets 
(WC08326) as operating income (after taxes) to total assets in year t-1; the Interest Coverage Ratio is 
the ratio of operating income (WC01250) to interest expense (WC01251) in year t-1. Because of the 
presence of outliers, we toss out companies with a cost of debt in the top/bottom percentile, as well as 
companies with an interest coverage ratio in the top/bottom percentile. 
We run separate regressions for connected and non-connected firms. Similarly, separate 
regressions are run for each of our earnings quality measure. The results are reported in Table 7. We 
find that, for non-connected firms, lower accruals quality (higher standard deviation of accruals, 
results in a significantly higher cost of debt (regressions 1, and 3). The cost of debt is negatively 
related with sales growth volatility, and leverage. These results are perhaps surprising. However, 
Francis et al. (2005) also find a negative relation between leverage and the cost of debt. The offered 
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the explanation that this may be driven by companies who chose not to lever because of the 
particularly high cost of debt they face. Another possibility is that some companies may repay their 
debt immediately before the end of the year in order to hide their financial position to the market; for 
these companies we would end up inferring high interest rates because of the procedure used to 
backup the cost of debt. We generally don’t find any relation between ROA and the interest coverage 
ratio, and the cost of debt. 
The results with respect to our control variables hold for the sample of connected firms 
(regressions 2, and 4). However, for connected firms we fail to find any relationship between earnings 
quality (when measured as standard deviation of discretionary accruals) and the cost of debt. 
Moreover, the difference between the coefficient of Stresid (10 yrs) in regressions (1) and (2) (non-
connected vs connected) is significant with a p-value of 0.008; the difference between the coefficient 
of Stresid (5 yrs) in regressions (3) and (4) (non-connected vs connected) is significant with a p-value 
of less than 0.001. This indicates that, despite their poor accruals quality, connected firms are not 
penalized by their lenders, which in turn, may be due to pressures faced by lenders, especially 
government owned banks. From our perspective this result explains why connected firms do not 
appear to care about the quality of their earnings, in that there is no penalty applied to those firms that 
report lower quality information.  
[Table 7 goes about here] 
 
VII. Conclusions.  
This study documents that the quality of reported accounting information is systematically 
poorer for firms with political connections than for firms lacking such connections. This conclusion is 
based on an analysis of accounting data from more than 7,000 firms in 21 countries. Political 
connections appear to be a more important predictor of accounting quality than several commonly 
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used country level variables such as the overall level of corruption, the quality of the legal system, or 
shareholder rights indicators. Indeed, after controlling for firm-specific factors (political connections, 
ownership structure, size, growth, leverage, market-to-book ratios), country-level factors are rarely 
statistically significant in our regressions. Moreover, connections occurring through a block-holder, 
and to politicians higher in the government have even stronger effects.  
Previous research has found that there are costs associated with lower quality accounting 
information, and our results are consistent with this finding, but with a twist. In particular, we provide 
evidence that lower quality reported earnings is associated with higher cost of debt only for the non-
politically connected firms in the sample. That is, companies that have political connections 
apparently face little negative consequences from their lower quality disclosures.  
To check the robustness of these results we have considered alternative measures of earnings 
quality, as well as performing the estimations using several different approaches (including OLS, IV, 
tobit, median regressions, re-computing our dependent variables using a logistic transformation, an 
inverse integral transformation, and taking logs.  We have also re-run the regressions eliminating 
outliers, and countries one at a time). With one exception, the results are robust to these alternatives.  
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Table 1. Countries, firms, and, connected firms included in the sample. 
The sample of firms was defined by two steps. In step 1, countries with more than 5 connected companies were selected from 
data provided by Faccio (2006). In step 2, we also require these firms to have a minimum of 9 consecutive years of 
accounting information available in Worldscope that allows us to compute our earnings quality measures. Accounting 
Standards, Anti-Director Rights, and Legal Enforcement are taken from La Porta et al. (1998) 
(http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/l&fweb.xls). Corruption Index is from Transparency International. 
Growth Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the annual growth in real GDP (in domestic currency). Inflation 
volatility is defined as the standard deviation of annual inflation over the period 1985-2005. In cases where fewer 
observations are available, we compute the standard deviation over the longest period for which a country has data. Per 
Capita income is defined for 2005, on a Purchasing Power Parity basis, and expressed in U.S. dollars.  The source for 
inflation, real GDP, and Per Capita Income is the World Economic Outlook Data base from the IMF, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28. 
Panel A: Number of Number Corruption Accounting Anti-Director 
 Countries Companies Connected Index Standards Rights 
1 Belgium 44 3 2.5 61 0 
2 Canada 246 2 1.5 74 5 
3 Denmark 89 3 0.5 62 2 
4 France 301 14 2.9 69 3 
5 Germany 323 9 1.8 62 1 
6 Hong Kong 245 3 2.0 69 5 
7 India 201 7 7.2 57 5 
8 Indonesia 93 25 8.0 NA 2 
9 Italy 93 10 5.2 62 1 
10 Japan 1806 27 3.1 65 4 
11 Malaysia 298 62 5.0 76 4 
12 Mexico 54 8 6.4 60 1 
13 Philippines 62 3 7.4 65 3 
14 Russia 3 2 7.2 NA NA 
15 Singapore 149 10 0.7 78 4 
16 South Korea 187 7 5.5 62 2 
17 Switzerland 115 4 0.9 68 2 
18 Taiwan 195 4 4.4 65 3 
19 Thailand 150 18 6.4 64 2 
20 UK 732 85 1.4 78 5 
21 US 1932 16 2.5 71 5 
 
Panel B: Legal Growth Inflation Per Capita Average (US$) 
 Countries Enforcement Volatility Volatility Income (US$) Market Cap 
1 Belgium 9.4 0.01 0.98 31,244 1,147,102 
2 Canada 9.8 0.02 1.46 34,273 1,194,607 
3 Denmark 10 0.02 1.07 34,740 765,399 
4 France 8.7 0.01 1.12 29,187 1,613,997 
5 Germany 9.1 0.02 1.28 30,579 1,624,611 
6 Hong Kong 8.9 0.04 5.17 33,479 806,830 
7 India 5.6 0.02 3.26 3,320 419,042 
8 Indonesia 2.9 0.05 11.34 4,459 272,777 
9 Italy 7.1 0.01 1.97 28,534 2,209,631 
10 Japan 9.2 0.02 1.24 30,615 1,170,736 
11 Malaysia 7.7 0.04 1.40 11,201 426,697 
12 Mexico 5.4 0.03 36.57 10,186 2,192,87 
13 Philippines 3.5 0.02 5.32 4,923 275,114 
14 Russia NA 0.07 242.80 11,041 11,904,822 
15 Singapore 8.9 0.04 1.29 28,368 522,435 
16 South Korea 5.6 0.04 2.22 20,590 135,558 
17 Switzerland 10 0.01 1.66 32,571 3,035,693 
18 Taiwan 7.4 0.03 1.69 27,721 884,693 
19 Thailand 4.9 0.05 2.09 8,368 111,174 
20 UK 9.2 0.01 1.95 30,436 1,414,390 
21 US 9.5 0.01 1.01 41,399 2,739,813 
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Table 2. Accounting Information Quality and Political Connections: Univariate Statistics.  
The measures of accounting information quality are the standard deviation (computed using the most recent 5-, 
or 10-years) of the firm’s discretionary accruals (estimated from equation 1 in the text). Connected is a dummy 
variable set equal to 1 if the company is connected to a politician and 0 otherwise. A company is classified as 
politically connected if at least one of its large shareholders (anybody directly or indirectly controlling at least 
10% of votes) or top directors (CEO, chairman of the board, president, vice-president, or secretary) is a member 
of parliament, a minister or a head of state, or is tightly related to a politician or party. For specific types of 
political connections, Gov takes the value 1 when the firm’s connection is with a government official; MP takes 
the value 1 when the firm’s connection is with a member of parliament; Other takes the value 1 when the 
connection is a friendship or other indirect connection; Own takes the value 1 when the connection is through a 
major shareholder; Director takes the value 1 when the connection is through a director of the firm. Family is a 
dummy variable set equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a family or individual who controls at least 20% of the 
votes and 0 otherwise.  
 
 10-year standard deviation of  5-year standard deviation of  
  Discretionary accruals   Discretionary accruals  
 N. of Obs. Mean  N. of Obs. Mean  
Connected = 1 205 0.0646 322 0.0649 
Connected = 0 4,701 0.0598 6,996 0.0572 
Difference (p-value)  (0.073)  (0.002) 
 
Family = 1   933 0.0676 1,445 0.0659 
Family = 0 1,348 0.0524 2,075 0.0523 
Difference (p-value)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
Specific types of political connections: 
 
Gov = 1 32 0.0845 48 0.0785 
Gov = 0 4,874 0.0599 7,270 0.0574 
Difference (p-value)   (0.000)  (0.001) 
 
MP = 1 112 0.0538 182 0.0558 
MP = 0 4,794 0.0602 7,136 0.0576 
Difference (p-value)  (0.072)  (0.581) 
 
Other = 1 65 0.0751 98 0.0776 
Other= 0 4,841 0.0598 7,220 0.0573 
Difference (p-value)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
 
own = 1 91 0.0763 142 0.0747 
own = 0 4,815 0.0597 7,176 0.0572 
Difference (p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
Director = 1 125 0.0558 197 0.0576 
Director = 0 4,781 0.0601 7,121 0.0575 
Difference (p-value)  (0.198)  (0.986) 
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Table 3. Standard deviation of discretionary accruals: OLS and median regressions. 
The dependent variable is defined as the standard deviation (over the most recent 10-years) of the firm’s 
discretionary accruals (estimated from equation 1 in the text) × 100. Connected is a dummy variable set equal to 
1 if the company is connected to a politician and 0 otherwise. A company is classified as politically connected if 
at least one of its large shareholders (anybody directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of votes) or top 
directors (CEO, chairman of the board, president, vice-president, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a 
minister or a head of state, or is tightly related to a politician or party. For specific types of political connections, 
Gov takes the value 1 when the firm’s connection is with a government official; MP takes the value 1 when the 
firm’s connection is with a minister of parliament; Other takes the value 1 when the connection is a friendship or 
other indirect connection; Own takes the value 1 when the connection is through a major shareholder; Director 
takes the value 1 when the connection is through a director of the firm. Control is the voting stake held by the 
largest ultimate shareholder. Family is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a family or 
individual who controls at least 20% of the votes and 0 otherwise. LnMkCap, is the natural log of the company’s 
market capitalization in US dollars. SalGrwtSD is the standard deviation of the annual growth of sales. Salgrwt is 
the annual growth of sales. MTB is the ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity. Leverage is total 
debt as percentage of total assets. Rights is the interaction between the index of Anti-Director Rights, and the 
index of Legal Enforcement. Anti-Director Rights is taken from La Porta et al. (1998). “The index is formed by 
adding 1 when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not 
required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional 
representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in 
place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent, or (6) shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can be 
waived only by a shareholders’ vote.” Legal Enforcement is computed as the average across the degree of 
efficiency of the judicial system, an assessment of the rule of law, and corruption. Corruption is from 
Transparency International (www.transparency.org). The TI index measures the “degree to which corruption is 
perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, drawing on 14 different polls 
and surveys from seven independent institutions, carried out among business people and country analysts, 
including surveys of residents, both local and expatriate.” Corruption represents “the abuse of public office for 
private gain.” The original index is rescaled from 0 to 10, higher value for higher corruption. Industry dummies 
are defined at the 4-digit SIC level. Models (1) thru (7) are ordinary least squares estimates. In the regressions, 
standard errors are adjusting for heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations at the country level. P-values 
are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Model (8) is a median regression. In the median 
regressions, standard errors are computed using bootstrap resampling (with 100 bootstrap replications) to control 
for heteroskedasticity (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993, and Wu, 1986). P-values are reported in parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates. 
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Table 3. Standard deviation of discretionary accruals: OLS and median regressions (Cont’d). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Connected 1.0959 1.1804 0.8062   1.2849 1.2911 0.9681 
 (0.036) (0.004) (0.003)   (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) 
Gov    1.8251     
    (0.015)     
Mp    0.2774     
    (0.435)     
Oth    2.2614     
    (0.000)     
Own     2.0885    
     (0.001)    
Dir      0.3072    
     (0.373)    
Control       0.0266   
      (0.454)   
Control2      -0.0002   
      (0.618)   
Family       0.6506  
       (0.116)  
LnMkCap -0.7074 -0.7044 -0.6049 -0.7030 -0.7017 -0.6125 -0.6201 -0.6594 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SalGrwtSD 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.088) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.947) 
SalGrwt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0085 0.0085 0.0000 
 (0.031) (0.195) (0.172) (0.211) (0.205) (0.006) (0.007) (0.996) 
MTB 0.0175 0.0085 0.0065 0.0071 0.0074 0.0099 0.0117 0.0274 
 (0.001) (0.013) (0.005) (0.023) (0.020) (0.572) (0.482) (0.264) 
Leverage  -0.0215 -0.0086 -0.0017 -0.0089 -0.0087 -0.0047 -0.0055 -0.0218 
 (0.000) (0.046) (0.660) (0.039) (0.044) (0.542) (0.445) (0.000) 
Rights  -0.0009 -0.0120  -0.0125 -0.0121 -0.0432 -0.0452 0.0018 
 (0.973) (0.625)  (0.600) (0.613) (0.133) (0.113) (0.691) 
Corruption  0.0402 0.0070  -0.0190 -0.0126 -0.1638 -0.1716 0.0805 
 (0.786) (0.963)  (0.899) (0.933) (0.384) (0.370) (0.028) 
Intercept 15.2029 15.3685  15.4619 15.4079 14.6782 15.0826 13.5768 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country dummies No No Yes No No No No No 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Number of obs. 4,506 4,506 4,793 4,506 4,506 2,030 2,030 4,506 
Adjusted R2 0.1493 0.2469 0.3221 0.2492 0.2485 0.2743 0.2762 0.0926 
 
 31
 
Table 4. Standard deviation of discretionary accruals: OLS and median regressions. 
The dependent variable, is defined as the standard deviation (over the most recent 5-years) of the firm’s 
discretionary accruals (estimated from equation 1 in the text) × 100. Independent variables are defined in Table 
3. Models (1) thru (7) are ordinary least squares estimates. In the regressions, standard errors are adjusting for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations at the country level. P-values are reported in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates. Model (8) is a median regression. In the median regressions, standard errors are 
computed using bootstrap resampling (with 100 bootstrap replications) to control for heteroskedasticity (see 
Efron and Tibshirani, 1993, and Wu, 1986). P-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Connected 1.0899 0.9556 0.5492   1.2646 1.2586 0.7443 
 (0.049) (0.057) (0.187)   (0.026) (0.026) (0.004) 
Gov    1.4355     
    (0.077)     
Mp    0.0180     
    (0.959)     
Oth    2.5982     
    (0.000)     
Own     2.0115    
     (0.005)    
Dir      0.0942    
     (0.749)    
Control       0.0367   
      (0.093)   
Control2      -0.0003   
      (0.142)   
Family       0.4439  
       (0.187)  
LnMkCap -0.7072 -0.6900 -0.6209 -0.6927 -0.6890 -0.6151 -0.6372 -0.5595 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SalGrwtSD 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.374) 
SalGrwt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0011 0.0000 
 (0.142) (0.061) (0.783) (0.043) (0.076) (0.022) (0.022) (0.988) 
MTB 0.0035 0.0011 0.0004 0.0009 0.0009 0.0132 0.0138 0.0095 
 (0.338) (0.781) (0.900) (0.819) (0.811) (0.069) (0.050) (0.337) 
Leverage  -0.0134 -0.0045 0.0035 -0.0051 -0.0048 -0.0018 -0.0030 -0.0182 
 (0.008) (0.218) (0.186) (0.179) (0.188) (0.692) (0.467) (0.000) 
Rights  -0.0231 -0.0349  -0.0352 -0.0349 -0.0558 -0.0614 -0.0186 
 (0.374) (0.138)  (0.126) (0.132) (0.023) (0.016) (0.000) 
Corruption  -0.0953 -0.1234  -0.1531 -0.1451 -0.2683 -0.2827 -0.0298 
 (0.527) (0.436)  (0.356) (0.373) (0.110) (0.103) (0.471) 
Intercept 15.7190 15.8017  15.9520 15.8658 15.0163 15.9436 12.5822 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country dummies No No Yes No No No No No 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Number of obs. 6,519 6,519 6,919 6,519 6,519 3,114 3,114 6,519 
Adjusted R2 0.1082 0.1766 0.2282 0.1796 0.1783 0.2187 0.2168 0.0604 
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Table 5. Robustness tests: Two-stage probit least squares. 
Regressions (1) and (3) are first stage probit regressions, in which the dependent variable is Connected. 
Connected is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the company is connected to a politician and 0 otherwise. A 
company is classified as politically connected if at least one of its large shareholders (anybody directly or 
indirectly controlling at least 10% of votes) or top directors (CEO, chairman of the board, president, vice-
president, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister or a head of state, or is tightly related to a politician 
or party. Regressions (2) and (4) are second stage (OLS) estimates, in which I_Connected is the predicted value 
of Connected estimated in the first stage. The instrumental variable used, Capital, is a dummy variable set equal 
to 1 if the company is headquartered in the capital of its country, and 0 otherwise. In regression (2), the 
dependent variable, Stresid, is defined as the standard deviation (over the most recent 10-years) of the firm’s 
discretionary accruals (estimated from equation 1 in the text) × 100. In regression (4), the dependent variable is 
defined as the standard deviation (over the most recent 5-years) of the firm’s discretionary accruals (estimated 
from equation 1 in the text) × 100. Independent variables are defined in Table 3. P-values are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The estimation is performed using the cdsimeq command in Stata 
(Maddala, 1983, Keshk, 2003). 
 
(1) 
First stage  
(Probit) 
(2) 
Second stage  
(OLS) 
(3) 
First stage  
(Probit) 
(4) 
Second stage  
(OLS) 
Dep. variable: 
 
Connected 
 
Stresid (10 yrs) 
 
Connected 
 
Stresid (5 yrs) 
 
Capital 0.6413  0.6756  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
I_Connected  1.1538  1.5369 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
LnMkCap 0.1157 -0.8250 0.1007 -0.8268 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SalGrwtSD 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 
 (0.876) (0.000) (0.858) (0.000) 
SalGrwt 0.0001 0.0028 0.0001 0.0008 
 (0.925) (0.001) (0.164) (0.003) 
MTB -0.0002 0.0095 -0.0083 0.0213 
 (0.976) (0.197) (0.036) (0.001) 
Leverage  0.0015 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.252) (0.913) (0.946) (0.101) 
Rights  -0.0081 0.0162 -0.0075 0.0006 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.916) 
Corruption  0.0838 -0.1133 0.0845 -0.2243 
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept -3.3803 18.1796 -3.1427 19.1365 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of obs. 4,393 5,765 
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Table 6. Discretionary accruals and the cost of debt: Univariate analysis. 
The table reports the average cost of debt for companies falling into different groups. Cost of Debt, is the ratio of 
a firm’s interest expense in year t (in our case 2005) over the average interest bearing obligations outstanding as 
of the end of year t-1 and t × 100. This ratio is converted in U.S. dollar terms using the covered interest parity. 
Connected is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the company is connected to a politician and 0 otherwise. A 
company is classified as politically connected if at least one of its large shareholders (anybody directly or 
indirectly controlling at least 10% of votes) or top directors (CEO, chairman of the board, president, vice-
president, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister or a head of state, or is tightly related to a politician 
or party. Stresid (10 yrs) is defined as the standard deviation (over the most recent 10-years) of the firm’s 
discretionary accruals (estimated from equation 1 in the text). Stresid (5 yrs) is defined as the standard deviation 
(over the most recent 5-years) of the firm’s discretionary accruals (estimated from equation 1 in the text). The 
first number is the average cost of debt (%); the second figure (in parenthesis) is the p-value of a t-stat for 
difference from zero; the third number is the number of observations. 
Panel A: Accruals quality proxy: Stresid (10 yrs) 
 Connected Non-connected 
Stresid (10 yrs) > sample median 6.99% 7.84% 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
 104 2,015 
Stresid (10 yrs) < sample median 5.56% 6.00% 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
 81 2,037 
Difference 1.43% 1.84% 
 (0.04) (0.00) 
 185 4,052 
Panel B: Accruals quality proxy: Stresid (5 yrs) 
 Connected Non-connected 
Stresid (5 yrs) > sample median 6.92% 7.74% 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
 138 2,658 
Stresid (5 yrs) < sample median 5.76% 5.95% 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
 114 2,682 
Difference 1.16% 1.79% 
 (0.04) (0.00) 
 252 5,340 
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Table 7. Discretionary accruals and the cost of debt. 
The dependent variable, Cost of Debt, is the ratio of a firm’s interest expense in year t (in our case 2005) over the 
average interest bearing obligations outstanding as of the end of year t-1 and t × 100. This ratio is converted in 
U.S. dollar terms using the covered interest parity. Stresid (10 yrs) is defined as the standard deviation (over the 
most recent 10-years) of the firm’s discretionary accruals (estimated from equation 1 in the text). Stresid (5 yrs) 
is defined as the standard deviation (over the most recent 5-years) of the firm’s discretionary accruals (estimated 
from equation 1 in the text). Leverage is total debt as percentage of total assets as of year end t-1; LnMkCap is 
measured as the natural log of the company’s market capitalization in US dollars, as of year end t-1; volatility is 
the standard deviation (SalGrwtSD) of sales growth during 1994-2005 (or the shorter period for which the data is 
available). ROA is the ratio of operating income (after taxes) to total assets in year t-1; the Interest Coverage 
Ratio is the ratio of operating income to interest expense in year t-1. Because of the presence of outliers, we toss 
out companies with a cost of debt in the top/bottom percentile, as well as companies with an interest coverage 
ratio in the top/bottom percentile. All models are ordinary least squares estimates. In the regressions, standard 
errors are adjusting for heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations at the country level. P-values are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Non-connected Connected Non-connected Connected 
Stresid (10 yrs) 24.7148 -1.2526   
 (0.0000) (0.8550)   
Stresid (5 yrs)   23.0416 -0.0266 
   (0.0000) (0.9950) 
Leverage -0.0505 -0.0625 -0.0260 -0.0456 
 (0.0010) (0.0910) (0.0340) (0.0280) 
LnMkCap -0.1552 -0.3663 -0.1613 -0.3318 
 (0.1410) (0.0880) (0.1220) (0.0130) 
SalGrwtSD -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0350) (0.0000) 
ROA -0.0051 -0.0453 -0.0002 -0.0318 
 (0.7300) (0.5330) (0.9180) (0.5750) 
Interest Cov. Ratio -0.0003 0.0051 -0.0003 0.0029 
 (0.8520) (0.5540) (0.8470) (0.6460) 
Intercept 8.7529 13.3557 8.2945 12.1431 
 (0.0000) (0.0030) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Number of obs. 3,947 182 5,164 245 
Adjusted R2 0.0494 0.1014 0.0371 0.0841 
 
  
